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Abstract
A central question in cognitive neuroscience regards the means by which options are compared and decisions are resolved
during value-guided choice. It is clear that several component processes are needed; these include identifying options, a
value-based comparison, and implementation of actions to execute the decision. What is less clear is the temporal
precedence and functional organisation of these component processes in the brain. Competing models of decision making
have proposed that value comparison may occur in the space of alternative actions, or in the space of abstract goods. We
hypothesized that the signals observed might in fact depend upon the framing of the decision. We recorded
magnetoencephalographic data from humans performing value-guided choices in which two closely related trial types were
interleaved. In the first trial type, each option was revealed separately, potentially causing subjects to estimate each action’s
value as it was revealed and perform comparison in action-space. In the second trial type, both options were presented
simultaneously, potentially leading to comparison in abstract goods-space prior to commitment to a specific action. Distinct
activity patterns (in distinct brain regions) on the two trial types demonstrated that the observed frame of reference used
for decision making indeed differed, despite the information presented being formally identical, between the two trial
types. This provides a potential reconciliation of conflicting accounts of value-guided choice.
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Introduction
Accounts of how the brain supports value-guided decision-
making have been characterised as lying along a continuous
spectrum [1]. At one end of the spectrum, it is argued that
decisions are a serial process, in which stimuli are first
perceived, then assigned values and fed to a subsequent decision
stage where comparison takes place [2,3]. Evidence in favour of
such a view comes from comparing the relative prevalence and
timing of pre- and post-decision variables encoded during
economic choice [4,5]. At the other end of the spectrum,
decisions are framed as a parallel process, in which valuation,
decision formation and action selection proceed simultaneously
[6,7]. Such a hypothesis is supported by the representation of
potential responses in motor regions prior to decision termina-
tion [8–11], from probing the motor system behaviourally
during the evolution of a decision [12,13], and by comparing
the relative timing of motor preparation responses in free- and
forced-choice decisions [14].
The diversity of accounts is perhaps a symptom of value
correlates being isolated in many different brain regions [15] –
such as medial prefrontal [16–21], parietal [22–24], and motoric
[25,26] structures – and also of the diverse frames of reference in
which these value correlates have been found. For example, one
prominent serial model of decision making proposes that value
comparison occurs in the frame of reference of abstract goods,
prior to the representation of choice [27]. This would most likely
occur in regions such as orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal
cortex, where goods-space value correlates have been isolated
[5,18,28]. By contrast, a prominent parallel model suggests that
comparison may take place in the frame of reference of actions
needed to obtain a certain outcome [7]. This comparison may
occur in structures such as motor and premotor cortex, in which
value-related neural signals tied to specific actions can be found
[8,14,24,29].
It remains unclear whether decision processes occur serially or
in parallel, and whether decision formation is principally resolved
in action- or goods-space. It is possible that each account may be
partially true, or that decisions are reached via a consensus
between different systems [30]. One further reconciliation between
the accounts might propose that the mechanism of decision
formation might be task-dependent – that is, the frame of reference in
which value-related signals are observed might depend upon both
the framing of the decision and the way the data are analysed.
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Whilst both systems may still operate in parallel, the sensitivity to
detect signals in a particular frame of reference might be strongly
influenced by the task used – and so the differences between the
tasks used across different studies might explain why goods-space
signals are observed in some studies, and action-space signals in
others.
To test this hypothesis, we designed a task in which subjects
faced two different, interleaved types of trial. Each trial type
comprised formally identical decisions, but had information
presented in a subtly different fashion.
In the first type of trial (‘comparison’ trial, as reported in [5]),
both options were presented simultaneously and subjects were free
to respond at any time. Importantly, such a trial can be solved in
several different ways. Decision formation could be carried out in
the frame of reference of action values, tied to both left and right
options, presumably in late motoric structures. Alternatively, it
could occur in the frame of reference of abstract goods,
presumably in frontal structures such as orbitofrontal or ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) before undergoing a goods-to-
action transformation. Although it is noteworthy that items are
rarely encountered exactly simultaneously in nature, it is also true
that such paradigms have been the norm in many studies of value
guided choice [4,14,16–18,28,31,32]. We hypothesised, based on
signals observed in these tasks [4,27,28], that value-related signals
might be observed in a goods frame of reference in this condition,
and also that these goods value signals might be localised in
structures such as VMPFC.
In the second type of trial (‘sequential’ trial), each option was
presented sequentially, with a delay between the presentation of
the first and second option, and a further delay before subjects
executed their response. There were thus two differences
between this trial type and the ‘comparison’ trial: first, its
sequential nature, and second, the additional delays before a
response was allowed. Again, such a trial could either be solved
in an action-space or a goods-space frame of reference.
However, both sequential presentation of options and the
imposition of a delay prior to response have previously been
used in tasks where action value signals have been recorded
[8,10,26,33]. Thus, we hypothesised that these two manipula-
tions, although subtle, might push subjects towards a strategy of
integrating information across probability and magnitude on
each action as it is presented, and contribute towards the
representation of a subjective value of making that action. This
would suggest that the decision process could take place in the
frame of reference of integrated action values [3,17,34], or that
decision formation might occur coincidentally with the planning
of the action necessary to execute the choice [7]. Either of these
possibilities would lead to value signals in an action-space frame
of reference as the decision was being made, and these signals
might be predicted to occur in later, motoric structures.
Results
Subject choice behaviour is similar across comparison
and sequential trials
18 subjects completed 324 trials of each type, pseudorandomly
interleaved, whilst undergoing magnetoencephalography (MEG).
In ‘comparison’ trials, both options were presented simultaneously,
until response. In ‘sequential’ trials, each option was presented
sequentially, with a delay before a response was allowed (figure 1A).
Subjects were not instructed to perform the task differently in each
condition, except that in the sequential trials, they had to wait until
the end of the delay period before they could respond (see
Materials and Methods).
We first compared subject choice behaviour in comparison and
sequential trials. We used logistic regression to test the influence of
each option’s reward probability and magnitude on subjects’
choices during each type of trial (figure 1B). Reward probability,
reward magnitude and their interaction each had a highly
significant influence on subject choices (one-sample T-test on
regression coefficients, all T(17).4.6, all p,0.0005), but impor-
tantly there was no significant difference in these influences
between the two types of trial (paired T-test on regression
coefficients between trial types, all |T(17)|,1.52, all p.0.14).
There was a slight bias towards choosing the second presented
option on sequential trials (T(17) = 2.90, p,0.01), but no such bias
towards choosing the left or right option on comparison trials
(T(17) =20.17, p=0.87).
We also fit models from Prospect theory [35,36] to describe
subject choice behaviour on both types of trial (figure 1C–E). We
fit a three-parameter model (a to describe curvature in subjective
reward magnitude weighting, c to describe non-linearities in
subjective probability weighting, and b to describe stochasticity in
choice behaviour) using maximum likelihood estimation. There
was a strong correlation across subjects between a on sequential
and comparison trials (figure 1A; R=0.84,p,0.0001), and
similarly for b (figure 1D; R=0.75,p,0.0005), although no such
correlation for c (figure 1C; R=0.11,p=0.67). (This difference is
potentially explained by the differing variances associated with the
different parameters (coefficients of variation: a, 0.51; b, 0.70; c,
0.17), which may imply that cross-subject variance in c is primarily
driven by noise in parameter fitting, rather than true variability in
the population.) Importantly, there was no significant difference
between fitted parameters on the two trial types, except for a trend
towards a being larger in comparison trials (paired T-test, a:
T(17) = 2.08, p=0.052; b: T(17) = 1.58, p=0.13; c: T(17) =
20.956, p=0.35).
In summary, behavioural results indicated that, even if subjects
were to have adopted a different strategy in solving the two types
of trial, their resultant choice behaviour was very similar in
sequential and comparison trials.
Author Summary
There are several competing theories of how the primate
brain supports the ability to choose between different
opportunities to obtain rewards – such as food, shelter, or
more abstract goods (e.g. money). These theories suggest
that the comparison of different options is either funda-
mentally dependent upon regions in prefrontal cortex (in
which representations of abstract goods are often found),
or upon motoric areas such as pre-motor and motor
cortices (in which representations of specific actions are
found). Evidence has been provided in support of both
theories, derived largely from studies using different
behavioural tasks. In this study, we show that a subtle
manipulation in the behavioural task can have profound
consequences for which brain regions appear to support
value comparison. We recorded whole-brain magnetoen-
cephalography data whilst subjects performed a decision
task. Value comparison-related 13–30 Hz oscillations were
found in ‘goods space’ in ventromedial prefrontal cortex in
one trial type, but in ‘action space’ in pre-motor and
primary motor cortices in another trial type - despite
information presented being identical across trial types.
This suggests both decision mechanisms are available in
the brain, and that the brain adopts the most appropriate
mechanism depending upon the current context.
Value-Based Choice: Goods or Action Space?
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Transition from value representation to choice in motor
cortex on ‘sequential’ trials
In both trial types, subjects chose left and right options with left
and right thumbpresses respectively, allowing us to investigate
decision formation in the frame of reference of actions by
interrogating the timecourse of lateralised responses in motor
cortices. We first investigated lateralised responses in sequential
trials. We localised motor cortex by performing a contrast of right
minus left planned responses, 500–1000 ms after the presentation
of the second option (figure 2A). In the beta band (13–30 Hz),
there was a greater degree of desynchronisation in the hemisphere
contralateral to the planned movement (i.e. left hemisphere
desynchonisation was greater on trials where a rightward
movement was planned (peak T(17) =25.59 (Montreal Neuro-
logical Institute (MNI) coordinates =236,234,54 mm),
T(17) =25.86 (MNI=250, 234, 254) whole-brain family-wise
error corrected p,0.05)), and a lesser degree of desynchronisation
in the hemisphere ipsilateral to the movement (i.e. right
hemisphere desynchronisation was lesser on trials where a
rightward movement was planned (peak T(17) = 4.63
(MNI=56,0,34 mm)). This pattern of pre-movement beta desyn-
chronisation is as would be expected from many previous studies
of response selection [37–40].
Having localised this beta desynchronisation during movement
preparation, we then investigated the temporal evolution of value
correlates in the same region. In all analyses, we included the
eventual categorical choice as a coregressor, to test whether signals
were better predicted by value or by choice. At the time of option
1 presentation, beta desynchronisation (in the hemisphere
contralateral to the side option 1 was presented on) was found
to correlate with the value of this option; the higher the value, the
more negative the beta power (figure 2B). As shown in figure 2B/
E, this signal first emerged approximately 500 ms after stimulus
Figure 1. Experimental design and behavioural results. (A) Experimental timeline. The experiment contained two types of trial in which
subjects chose between two risky prospects associated with differing reward magnitudes (bar widths) and reward probabilities (percentages). In
‘comparison’ trials, both options were presented simultaneously and subjects were free to respond as soon as they had made their decision. In
‘sequential’ trials, options were presented one after the other and subjects were free to respond once a question-mark appeared in the centre of the
screen. (B) Logistic regression weights (mean +/2 s.e.m.) of explanatory variables on choice behaviour on comparison trials (left) and sequential trials
(right). (C) Prospect theory utility function parameters on comparison trials (ordinate) and sequential trials (abscissa); each datapoint represents the fit
for an individual subject. Line shows least-squares fit to data (correlations reported in main text). (D) As (C), for softmax function parameters. (E) As (C),
for probability weighting function parameters.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003225.g001
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presentation (significant cluster delineated by black line in
figure 2B, tested via a cluster-based permutation test that corrects
for multiple comparisons across time and frequency (see Materials
and Methods)). It remained in the region throughout the delay
period (in which the option was removed and replaced with a
central word ‘OR’) (peak T(17) =23.83, t = 1975 ms post-stimulus
presentation, 14 Hz; cluster-corrected p,0.05, permutation test).
The negative coefficient of the value correlate (shown in figures 2B
and 2E) reflects increased desynchronisation [26,37–40] in the beta
band at the time of option 1. At the time of option 2 presentation,
there was a negative correlate of the difference in value between
the option contralateral to the hemisphere and the option
ipsilateral to the hemisphere (figure 2C), with a significant cluster
centred around 400 ms post-stimulus presentation; the greater the
value difference between contralateral and ipsilateral options, the
more negative the beta power (peak T(17) =23.91, t = 325 ms
post-stimulus, 23 Hz; cluster-corrected p,0.05). Such a signal is a
value difference signal, but importantly it is tied to the frame of
reference of a specific action (contralateral vs. ipsilateral move-
ment), rather than the frame of reference of which option will be
chosen on the current trial. (It is notable that part of this signal
may be driven by the value of option 1, which is known prior to
option 2 presentation – and so the effect of value difference may
arise much earlier than when analysed time-locked to option 1
presentation. Indeed, when split into the separate subcomponents,
option 1 influenced beta desynchronisation earlier than option 2
(see figure S1)).
Using the regressor for categorical choice, we also identified a
signal reflecting the categorical commitment to a rightward or
leftward action (figure 2D) in the same region of interest, with beta
desynchronisation being more negative when choices (button
presses) were made to the side contralateral to the hemisphere
than to the side ipsilateral to the hemisphere. Such a finding is
unsurprising, as the region of interest was selected on the basis of
differential beta desycnchronisation on left vs. right buttonpresses.
However, the critical test is the timing of this categorical decision
signal (figure 2D) relative to the action value signals (figure 2B/C).
When the first option was presented (figure 2E), beta descynchro-
nisation was explained by the value of the contralateral option
(blue line) over and above any possible variance that could be
attributed to the eventual choice that the subject would make (red
line). This was because both value and choice regressors were
included in the same multiple regression model, and whereas value
correlates were significantly different from zero, choice correlates
were not. From figure 2F, we see that in a similar multiple
regression model, the categorical decision signal emerged prior to
the time at which subjects were allowed to make their response,
but after the value difference signal (peak T(17) =27.36,
t = 775 ms post-stimulus, 18 Hz). This suggests a transition from
initially representing action value difference, to subsequently
Figure 2. Motor cortex beta desynchronisation represents progression from value representation to choice on ‘sequential’ trials. (A)
Statistical parametric map for contrast of beta band (13–30 Hz) activity for right buttonpresses.left buttonpresses, 500 ms–1000 ms after option 2
presentation (thresholded at T(17).2.91, p,0.005 uncorrected, for display purposes). Warm colors reflect decreased beta desynchronisation in right
hemisphere (ipsilateral to movement), cool colors reflect increased beta desynchronisation in left hemisphere (contralateral to movement). (B)
Correlates of the value of option 1 at time of option 1 presentation, in hemisphere contralateral to option presentation. Color represents T-statistic;
bordered areas reflect significant clusters (cluster-corrected p,0.05; permutation test). (C) Correlates of the value difference between the options
contralateral and ipsilateral to the hemisphere, at the time of option 2 presentation. (D) Contrast of trials on which the chosen option is contralateral
vs. ipsilateral to the hemisphere, at the time of option 2 presentation. (E) Timecourse of beta band correlates of value of contralateral option (blue
and choice (red) at time of option 1 presentation. Lines represent mean +/2 95% confidence intervals across subjects. (Note that as 95% confidence
intervals are plotted, rather than standard error of the mean (s.e.m.), error bars are ,1.96 times wider than when plotting s.e.m.). (F) Timecourse of
beta band correlates of value difference (blue) and choice (red) between options contralateral vs. ipsilateral to the hemisphere at time of option 2
presentation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003225.g002
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representing categorical choice. We formally compared the
relative timing of these two signals by comparing the time of the
peak T-statistic in each subject for the two signals (figure 3); this
confirmed that the value-related signal preceded the categorical
decision signal (paired T(17) = 2.14, p,0.05).
The relative timing of these value-related and categorical choice
signals may reflect two possibilities. It may suggest that in sequential
trials, late motoric structures directly support the comparison of
values tied to specific actions. Alternatively, it may be that an
evolving decision process taking place in other cortical structures is
continually biasing action preparation or planning in motor cortex.
In either case, it is clear that value correlates are present in motor
cortex before a categorical decision has been reached.
Categorical representation of choice, but not value, in
motor cortex on ‘comparison’ trials
We next investigated whether similar value signals could be seen
prior to the representation of choice in comparison trials. Again,
we found that 500–1000 ms after the decision was presented, there
was a differential response for right versus left buttonpresses, with
less beta band desynchronisation in the right hemisphere for
rightward than for leftward movements (figure 4A; peak
T(17) = 11.42, MNI= 28,214,54, voxelwise whole brain corrected
p,1*1025). When searching for a correlate of the value of the
options contralateral versus ipsilateral to the hemisphere, we
timelocked to the response rather than the stimulus, as in this
condition responses occurred at varying latencies rather than a
fixed delay – and so, because reaction times correlate negatively
with value difference [5], beta desynchronisation that was in fact
associated with responses made at different latencies would give
rise to spurious correlations with value.
Using this analysis, we found that there was no correlate of the
difference in value between the option contralateral and the option
ipsilateral to the hemisphere in the beta band, nor indeed in any
frequency band from 1–40 Hz (figure 4B). By contrast, consistent
with figure 4A, there was still a strong correlate of the categorical
choice, with beta desynchronisation being more negative when
choices were made to the contralateral side than to the ipsilateral
side (figure 4C), peaking near the time of the response (peak
T(17) =25.46, t = 175 ms post-response, 26 Hz). Thus, on
comparison trials, in contrast to the sequential trials, there was a
categorical representation of choice but no lateralised representa-
tion of action value prior to the formation of the decision.
On both sequential and comparison trials, we also found a
similar set of signals emerged if we examined activity in lateral pre-
motor, rather than primary motor, cortex (figure 5).
The absence of an action-value signal in comparison trials is a
negative result, and so might be interpreted as a consequence of
insufficient statistical power. To demonstrate that this was not the
case, we used a formal interaction test (described below) and found
a significant difference in action-value signals between the two
conditions.
Representation of value difference in ventromedial
prefrontal cortex on ‘comparison’ trials
We then searched for response-locked correlates of value on
comparison trials in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), a
region we have previously identified as playing an important role
in value comparison on these trials [5,16]. We analysed data from
the same region of VMPFC identified in our previous study [5], in
which we found that (stimulus-locked) there was a temporal
evolution from a representation of overall value to value difference
in low frequencies (2–10 Hz). The location of this region of interest
(MNI=6,28,26 mm) also lies within a cluster of activations
identified in a recent meta-analysis of human functional MRI
studies of value-guided choice [19]. We hypothesised, based on
signals observed in other studies of this region, that it would not
encode value in the frame of reference of actions, but of choice
[5,16,18,32] – which might be the result of a comparison
occurring in ‘goods space’ [27,28]. Based on our previous work
[5], we also hypothesised that this region might particularly
encode value on ‘harder’ trials, in which probability and magnitude
advocate opposing choices, but not on ‘nobrainer’ trials, in which
both probability and magnitude were both larger on the same side
than on the other. Critically, we note that these harder trials are
precisely those on which a comparison of attribute differences
might be necessary to resolve the decision.
On harder comparison trials, there was a positive correlate of
the difference in value between chosen and unchosen options in
the beta band approximately 750 ms prior to the response
(figure 6A; peak T(17) = 4.05; t = 975 ms pre-response;
F = 10 Hz). This value difference signal is in a different frame of
Figure 3. Relative latency of ‘action value difference’ and
‘choice’ effects (both in motor cortex beta desynchronisation)
after stimulus 2 presentation on ‘sequential’ trials. (A) Compar-
ison of the latency of the peak correlate of ‘value difference’ regressor in
motor cortex beta desynchronisation (blue) against the latency of the
peak correlate of the ‘categorical choice’ regressor in motor cortex beta
desynchronisation (red). * denotes p,0.05, paired T-test across 18
subjects. (B) Histogram of individual subjects’ latency differences
between ‘value difference’ peak latency and ‘categorical choice’ peak
latency; red line denotes median latency across subjects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003225.g003
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reference to that isolated in primary motor cortex: it is not tied
to the frame of reference of one or other specific action, but
instead to the choice that is to be made. Importantly, when split
into its subcomponents, this ‘goods-value’ signal contained both
a positive correlate of the value of the chosen option and a
negative correlate of the value of the unchosen option
(figure 6D). Again, we formally compared the relative timing
of this value-related signal in VMPFC to that of the categorical
choice signal in motor cortex, by extracting the peak T-statistic
for each signal in each subject (figure 7); we found that the
VMPFC value related signal preceded the categorical motor
signal (paired T(17) = 2.25, p,0.05).
In contrast, on ‘nobrainer’ comparison trials, we found no
significant correlation in VMPFC with the value difference
between the chosen option minus the value of the unchosen
option, nor of the subcomponents of this signal (figure 6B/E).
However, this finding was complemented by signal in the posterior
superior parietal lobule (pSPL), a region isolated in our previous
study as showing similar dynamics to VMPFC in lower frequency
bands (2–10 Hz), but across both harder and nobrainer trials [5]. In
the beta band (13–30 Hz), pSPL showed a synchronisation that
correlated positively with chosen-unchosen value across both
harder (figure 8A/D) and nobrainer (figure 8B/E) trials, consistent
with our previous study.
Finally, both VMPFC and pSPL also showed no correlation
of chosen-unchosen value (or the separated subcomponents) on
harder sequential trials (figure 6C/F; figure 8C/F), or nobrainer
sequential trials. This finding is particularly important, as it
suggests that when values are represented in ‘action space’ as a
choice is being made (as was the case in sequential trials), there
was no longer a detectable ‘goods space’ comparison in these
regions. As before, we note that this is a negative result, and so
we test it by comparing the strength of goods-value signals in
each trial type formally below. We were also unable to detect
any action value signal or categorical choice signals (equivalent
to those observed in motoric structures above) in VMPFC or
pSPL (figures S2 and S3).
Formal contrast of effects in motor cortex and VMPFC in
comparison and sequential trials
Finally, we formally compared the effect of value in VMPFC
and motor cortex across the two trial types. In each subject, we
extracted the peak T-statistic for the effect of value difference
between the options in the ipsilateral and contralateral hemi-
spheres from motor cortex, and the effect of value difference
between chosen and unchosen options in VMPFC. We restricted
our analysis to the beta band (13–30 Hz), focussing on the period
from 2nd stimulus onset up to 1 s post-stimulus on sequential trials,
and from 1 s pre-response until response time on comparison
trials. As the same frequency range was examined in each region/
condition, and the regions of interest were isolated via orthogonal
contrasts, this analysis was protected against circular inference
[41]. A repeated measures ANOVA with independent variables of
brain region (VMPFC/motor cortex) and trial type (comparison/
sequential) revealed a significant interaction between these two
variables on the peak effect of value (F1,17 = 7.29, p,0.02). Post-hoc
T-tests revealed that there was a significantly greater effect of
chosen-unchosen value in VMPFC on comparison trials than on
sequential trials (paired T(17) = 2.42, p,0.05), and a slightly
greater effect of ipsilateral-contralateral value in motor cortex on
sequential trials than on comparison trials (paired T(17) = 1.83,
p,0.05 one-tailed).
Discussion
Conflicting accounts of value-guided choice have proposed
that decision formation is either supported principally by
comparing the value of alternative goods, or by the comparing
the value of alternative actions. In the present study, we isolated
evidence in support of both accounts, but in two distinct types of
trial – one (comparison trials) in which goods-space value
comparison signals were more readily apparent, and another
(sequential trials) in which action value-space signals were
found. These findings therefore present a possible reconciliation
Figure 4. Motor cortex beta band desynchronisation reflects choice, but not value, on ‘comparison’ trials. (A) Statistical parametric
map for contrast of beta band (13–30 Hz) activity for right buttonpresses.left buttonpresses, 500 ms–1000 ms after decision presentation
(thresholded at T(17).2.91, p,0.005 uncorrected, for display purposes). Warm colors reflect decreased beta desynchronisation in right hemisphere
(ipsilateral to movement). (B) Correlates of value difference between the options contralateral and ipsilateral to the hemisphere, timelocked to the
response. Color represents T-statistic; the absence of any bordered region reflects the absence of any significant clusters surviving multiple
comparisons correction. (C) Contrast of trials on which chosen option was contralateral vs. ipsilateral to the hemisphere. Bordered areas reflect
significant clusters (cluster-corrected P,0.05; permutation test).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003225.g004
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Figure 5. Lateral premotor cortex, similar to primary motor cortex, shows ‘action-space’ value followed by choice signals during
sequential trials (A–E), and choice signal but no value signal during comparison trials (F–G). Parts A–E are equivalent to parts B–F of figure 2.
(A) Correlates of the value of option 1 at time of option 1 presentation, in hemisphere contralateral to option presentation. Color represents T-
statistic; bordered areas reflect significant clusters (cluster-corrected P,0.05; permutation test). (B) Correlates of the value difference between the
options contralateral and ipsilateral to the hemisphere, at the time of option 2 presentation. (C) Contrast of trials on which the chosen option is
contralateral vs. ipsilateral to the hemisphere, at the time of option 2 presentation. (D) Timecourse of beta band correlates of value of contralateral
option (blue and choice (red) at time of option 1 presentation. Lines represent mean +/2 95% confidence intervals across subjects. (Note that as 95%
confidence intervals are plotted, rather than standard error of the mean (s.e.m.), error bars are ,1.96 times wider than when plotting s.e.m.). (E)
Timecourse of beta band correlates of value difference (blue) and choice (red) between options contralateral vs. ipsilateral to the hemisphere at time of
option 2 presentation. Parts F–G are equivalent to parts B–C of figure 4. (F) Correlates of value difference between the options contralateral and ipsilateral
to the hemisphere, timelocked to the response. (G) Contrast of trials on which chosen option was contralateral vs. ipsilateral to the hemisphere.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003225.g005
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of the two accounts – that the brain adaptively adopts the
strategy most appropriate to the current context.
The hypothesis that different tasks may be solved in different
frames of reference may help to resolve apparently discrepant
findings from previous studies in the literature. In one set of studies
examining single unit activity during an economic choice task,
Padoa-Schioppa and colleagues have identified dissociations
between activity in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC). In this task, OFC neurons encode both
pre- and post-decision variables, but not in the frame of reference
of actions [28]. By contrast, ACC neurons encode solely post-
decision variables, and are modulated by movement direction [4].
This has led to the hypothesis that in this task, items (here
quantities of fruit juice) are compared in an abstract ‘goods space’
in OFC/VMPFC, before undergoing a goods-to-action transfor-
mation in ACC in order to implement the required action to
obtain that item [27]. This hypothesis gains support from the
presence of post-decision (chosen value) signals in VMPFC in a
task in which a stimulus value-based comparison is made, but the
action needed to implement the decision is not yet known [18]. On
the other hand, it appears that when subjects are presented with
tasks that can only depend upon learnt action values rather than
stimulus values, then the structure critical for value-guided choice
may change, with lesions to ACC and not OFC affecting
behaviour [31,42]. In even simpler forced-choice trials, on a task
that does not require integration of information across multiple
dimensions, there appears to be a temporal evolution from
the initial coding of option values to the subsequent coding of
action-related signals within relatively late, motoric structures,
such as the supplementary eye fields [43]. In experiments where
multiple possible actions are presented and held in working
memory prior to a decision cue, enhanced representations of
these actions can be seen prior to the decision in premotor
cortex [8]. Similarly, when a free choice is made between
alternative arm movements, evidence for a competitive decision
mechanism (in the frame of reference of actions) is found in the
parietal reach region [44]. Thus, in tasks where decisions in
stimulus space or goods space are favoured, then neural
correlates of the decision process is found in a stimulus- or
goods-related frame of reference, whereas in tasks more closely
tied to the comparison of different actions, correlates of the
decision process appear in an action frame of reference. This
observation unifies apparently discrepant findings as to the
precise locus of decision-making processes in the brain.
On the other hand, the differing signals across the two trial types
may not be a reflection of different neural mechanisms of choice
being used in each context, but instead differential sensitivity to one
or other mechanism in our analysis. For instance, it is possible that
action value signals are present in motor cortices in all trials, but
without a delay period they become too transient to be detected.
Similarly, it is possible that the relatively weak sensitivity of MEG
to deep anterior structures such as VMPFC [45] means that on
sequential trials, any value comparison process that takes place
over a space of several seconds is too weak to be detected. Future
studies may address these questions by direct invasive recording
from these structures, across different conditions.
Figure 6. Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) beta band synchronisation reflects value difference on harder ‘comparison’
trials, but not on ‘sequential’ trials. (A) Correlates of the value difference between chosen and unchosen options, timelocked to the response, on
harder comparison trials. Color represents T-statistic; bordered areas reflect significant clusters (cluster-corrected P,0.05; permutation test). (B) As (A),
but for ‘nobrainer’ trials in which probability and magnitude advocated the same response. (C) Correlates of the value difference between chosen and
unchosen options, timelocked to option 2 presentation, on harder sequential trials. (D) Separating the VMPFC beta band response on harder
comparison trials reveals a positive correlate of the value of the chosen option (blue) and a negative correlate of the value of the unchosen option
(red) prior to the response. Bars represent mean +/2 95% confidence intervals across subjects. (E) As (D), but for ‘nobrainer’ trials. (F) Separating the
beta band response on harder sequential trials reveals no correlate of either chosen or unchosen value in VMPFC at the time of option 2 presentation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003225.g006
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Our findings from the sequential trials suggested one of two
possibilities. One interpretation is that these trials were solved
using a comparison of action values, as demonstrated by the
transformation from a lateralised action value signal into a
categorical choice signal in motor cortex beta band oscillations. An
alternative account is that this signal is better interpreted as a
(graded) motor planning signal, but there was a continual updating
of this plan as a consequence of value comparison taking place
elsewhere. Here, it is perhaps telling that many signals that have
been interpreted as the intention to move by one set of researchers
[46] have been related to decision-related signals by others [22].
In either case, these results have additional implications for our
understanding of the role of motor cortex beta band oscillations in
action selection. Whereas early accounts of these oscillations
suggested that they might reflect an ‘idling rhythm’ [47], more
recent suggestions have proposed that beta desynchronisations
may reflect a change in the current sensorimotor set or status quo
[38], or an increased likelihood of generating a novel voluntary
action [39,40]. Such proposals align with a role for decreases in
beta band activity during response preparation, an idea corrob-
orated by recent findings that lateralised beta reflects the
accumulation of evidence for a leftward or rightward response
during perceptual discrimination [9]. By contrast, a recent study
has highlighted that lateralised beta band desynchronisation
reflects the evidence for a particular response, rather than
response preparation per se, whilst integrating evidence to make a
decision [26]. The current findings on ‘sequential’ trials suggest a
similar role for beta desynchronisation, as evidenced by the
correlation with action value above and beyond any correlation
with the categorical response that is going to be effected on a given
trial (figure 2).
On comparison trials, we found that in the beta band, value
comparison signals emerged in VMPFC (figure 6) that preceded
categorical choice signals in primary motor cortex. Critically, we
found that such signals were present on trials in which magnitude
and probability advocated opposing choices (‘harder’ trials), but
not on trials in which they both advocated the same choice
(‘nobrainer’ trials). Such trials are those on which conflict between
the two attributes comes into play, and attention must be guided to
the attribute that is most salient for determining the current
decision. Notably, this was not the case in the posterior superior
parietal lobule (figure 8), in which goods value difference signals
were present on both ‘harder’ and ‘nobrainer’ trials. This replicates
findings in lower frequency ranges (2–10 Hz) from the same
dataset [5], and may reflect an important difference between
VMPFC and parietal cortex when considering value-guided
choices with multiple attributes.
One further noteworthy difference between the signals observed
in comparison and sequential trials is the relative timing of value
difference and categorical choice signals in the two trial types. In
sequential trials (figure 3), there was a median latency difference of
approximately 200 ms between the peak of (action) value
difference signal in motor cortex, and the peak of the categorical
choice signal in the same region. By contrast, in comparison trials
(figure 7), there was a median latency difference of around 500 ms
between the peak of the (goods) value difference signal in VMPFC,
and the peak of the categorical choice signal in motor cortex. Such
differences would be expected if it were assumed that there is a
temporal cost for translating signals in goods space into action
space, and for conveying the results of computations from one
brain region to another.
It is important to note that there are two differences between the
comparison and sequential trials – both the imposition of a delay
prior to the response, and the sequential vs. simultaneous
presentation of options. These differences were selected as they
captured some of the key differences between previous paradigms
in which goods and action value signals had been observed in
previous tasks. It is, of course, completely reasonable that
investigators have designed paradigms more like our ‘comparison’
trial type [4,14,16–18,28,31,32] or like our ‘sequential’ trial type
[4,27,28] – importantly, however, the signals they observe may
lead them to different conclusions about the neural mechanisms of
value-guided choice. Future work will be needed to refine precisely
which of these two manipulations is most critical for pushing
signals towards being found in one space or another. It is
noteworthy, for instance, that in some experiments where options
have been presented simultaneously but a delay is still imposed,
goods-space value signals can still be isolated (albeit using different
measures of neural activity) [16,48].
Figure 7. Relative latency of ‘goods value difference’ effect (in
VMPFC beta synchronisation) and ‘choice’ effect (in motor
cortex beta desynchronisation), timelocked to response on
‘comparison’ trials. (A) Comparison of the latency of the peak
correlate of ‘value difference’ regressor in VMPFC beta synchronisation
(blue) against the latency of the peak correlate of the ‘categorical
choice’ regressor in motor cortex beta desynchronisation (red). *
denotes p,0.05, paired T-test across 18 subjects. (B) Histogram of
individual subjects’ latency differences between ‘value difference’ peak
latency and ‘categorical choice’ peak latency; red line denotes median
latency across subjects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003225.g007
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In previous fMRI studies of sequential choice [10], VMPFC
has been found to encode a goods value signal at the time of
option presentation. At first sight, this appears discrepant with
the absence of a goods value signal in VMPFC on our
‘sequential’ trials. Whilst a beta-gamma desynchronisation in
VMPFC appeared to carry some information about the value of
option 1, this did not reach statistical significance (figure S2). It
is important, however, to consider the differences between what
computational processes are likely to be visible to fMRI and
MEG recordings. We have previously demonstrated that the
MEG signal during goods value comparison can be modelled by
the dynamics of competition in an excitation-inhibition network
(EIN) [5]. This suggests valuation signals visible to MEG reflect
trial-to-trial variability in this dynamic, competitive process. By
contrast, the relationship between EIN activity and the BOLD
fMRI signal is more complex, but it is related not only to local
processing, but also to afferent input to a brain region [49]. One
potential reconciliation of these findings is therefore that a goods
value ‘afferent input’ signal is always present in VMPFC, and so
can be seen in VMPFC fMRI signal, even when comparison can
be found to take place in later, motoric structures [10]. By
contrast, in situations when VMPFC supports comparison of
options in goods space, this local processing is witnessed in both
MEG dynamics [5] and also in fMRI value difference signals
[16,32,50].
In summary, we have here presented evidence that when
performing two formally identical decision tasks, the temporal
evolution of value-related and choice signals differs depending
upon how the information is revealed to subjects. If the value of
each action is revealed separately, decision signals appear in an
action-based frame of reference, reflected by beta desynchronisa-
tions in motor cortex. If both options are presented simultaneous-
ly, and subjects have to integrate across dimensions to form their
decision, decision signals appear in an abstract frame of reference
(chosen value minus unchosen value), reflected in beta synchro-
nisations in VMPFC.
Materials and Methods
Experimental task
18 subjects (age range 21–33, 10 male, 8 female, recruited from
the University of Oxford) repeatedly chose between two risky
prospects, comprising differing reward magnitudes (represented by
bar width) and probabilities (represented numerically), in order to
obtain monetary reward (figure 1A). The probabilities of winning
on each option were independent; thus, on any given trial, both,
neither or either option(s) might yield reward. Stimuli were drawn
such that reward magnitude and probability were never identical
across the two options; subjects therefore needed to integrate
across stimulus dimensions to make optimal choices. On some
Figure 8. Right posterior superior parietal lobule, identified in our previous study of reward-guided decision making [5], shows
beta correlates of chosen-unchosen value on both ‘harder’ and ‘nobrainer’ comparison trials, but not on harder sequential trials.
Parts A–F are equivalent to parts A–F of figure 6. (A) Correlates of the value difference between chosen and unchosen options, timelocked to the
response, on harder comparison trials. Color represents T-statistic; bordered areas reflect significant clusters (cluster-corrected P,0.05; permutation
test). (B) As (A), but for ‘nobrainer’ trials in which probability and magnitude advocated the same response. (C) Correlates of the value difference
between chosen and unchosen options, timelocked to option 2 presentation, on harder sequential trials. (D) Separating the pSPL beta band response
on harder comparison trials reveals a positive correlate of the value of the chosen option (blue) and a negative correlate of the value of the unchosen
option (red) prior to the response. Bars represent mean +/2 95% confidence intervals across subjects. (E) As (D), but for ‘nobrainer’ trials. (F)
Separating the beta band response on harder sequential trials reveals no correlate of either chosen or unchosen value in pSPL at the time of option 2
presentation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003225.g008
Value-Based Choice: Goods or Action Space?
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 10 September 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e1003225
trials, however, both probability and magnitude were larger on
one side than the other, a decision we classify as a ‘no brainer’.
On comparison trials, decisions were presented onscreen until a
response was made. On sequential trials, one option was presented
for 800–1200 ms jittered, followed by a 200–400 ms jittered delay,
then the second option for 800–1200 ms jittered; subjects could
respond only after removal of the second option. Stimuli were
presented on either side of a fixation point; subjects selected the
left option with a left-thumb button press, and the right option
with a right-thumb buttonpress.
The difference between the two conditions was explained to the
subjects in the instruction sheet thus: ‘For half of the decisions you
have to make, you will see the screen as shown above (in figure 1A).
In these trials, simply respond as soon as you feel that you have
made your decision. For the other half of the decisions you have to
make, you will see the two gambles one after the other, and then
be presented with a screen displaying only a question mark. In
these trials, you must wait for the question mark to appear before
responding.’
On choosing a rewarded option, a ‘winnings bar’ displayed at
the bottom of the screen increased in magnitude in proportion to
the width of the chosen option. When this winnings bar reached a
gold target on the far right of the screen, £2 was added to subjects’
earnings, and the winnings bar reset itself to its original size. Total
typical earnings for the task ranged from £26 to £34.
All subjects provided informed consent in accordance with local
ethical guidelines.
Behaviour: Fitting of subjective value functions
Subjective utility functions were derived from Prospect Theory
[35], and were of the following form:
v(ro)~ro
a
w(po)~
po
c
(pocz(1{po)
c)
1
c
where ro and po are the reward magnitude and probability of
gaining reward, respectively, on outcome o. The subjective
expected value of outcome o was calculated as:
sEVo~v(ro)|w(po)
The probability of choosing each option was then calculated using
a softmax choice rule:
P(C~o)~
e
sEVo
t
Pn
i~1
e
sEVi
t
where n is the number of options (2 for this study) and t is a
temperature parameter that determines the stochasticity of
action selection. Values of a, c, and 1/t (inverse temperature,
denoted by b in results section) were fit by maximizing the
likelihood of each subject’s choices in the experiment, using
non-linear fitting routines in MATLAB (The Mathworks,
Natick, MA), separately for sequential and comparison trials.
As in [5], we found that Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC)
favoured Prospect theory over a simpler model that used
objective probability and magnitude to compute expected value.
A comparison between fitted parameter values in sequential and
comparison trials is shown in figure 1C–E. The fitted values
were used to calculate subjective expected values, which have
been found to provide a better fit to neural data in value-guided
decision tasks [51,52], to use as trialwise regressors in analysis of
MEG data.
Behaviour: Logistic regression analysis
We used logistic regression to investigate the influence of p1-p2
(probability difference between option 1 and 2), r1-r2 (reward
magnitude difference) and EV1-EV2 (objective expected value
difference) on the probability of choosing option 1 (see figure 1B).
This was performed separately for each trial type. We normalised
each explanatory variable before entry into the logistic regression
(to ensure that parameter estimates were comparable across the
different variables), and included a constant term to model any
bias towards choosing one option over the other. For each
explanatory variable and each trial type, we then performed a one-
sample T-test across subjects’ parameter estimates, to infer which
variables had a significant effect on choice behaviour. We also
performed a paired T-test between parameter estimates for
sequential and comparison trials for each explanatory variable,
to infer whether any variables had a greater or lesser influence on
behavior between the two trial types.
MEG/MRI data acquisition
MEG data were sampled at 1000 Hz on a 306-channel
VectorView system (Elekta Neuromag, Helsinki, Finland),
with one magnetometer and two orthogonal planar gradiom-
eters at each of 102 locations distributed in a hemispherical
helmet across the scalp, in a magnetically shielded room. A
band-pass filter of 0.03–330 Hz was applied during acquisi-
tion. Head position was monitored at the beginning of each
run, and at twenty-minute intervals during each run, using
four head position indicator (HPI) coils attached to the scalp.
Data were acquired in two or three runs, with pauses between
blocks to save data acquired. HPI coil locations, headpoints
from across the scalp, and 3 anatomical fiducial locations
(nasion, left and right pre-auricular points) were digitized
using a Polhemus Isotrak II prior to data acquisition.
Simultaneous 60-channel electroencephalography data was
acquired using a MEG-compatible EEG cap (ANT Neuro,
Enschede, Netherlands), but is not discussed here. Vertical
electrooculogram (EOG) and electrocardiogram were also
measured to detect eye blinks and heartbeat, respectively.
Stimuli were presented on a screen situated 1.5 meters away
from the subject, inside the magnetically shielded room;
stimuli were displayed via projector (refresh rate 60 Hz)
situated outside the room. Stimulus presentation and timing
was controlled using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral
Systems, Albany, CA).
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data for forward model
generation were acquired using an magnetization-prepared rapid
gradient echo (MP-RAGE) sequence on a Siemens 3T TRIO
scanner, with voxel resolution 16161 mm3 on a 17661926192
grid, echo time=4.53 ms, inversion time= 900 ms, recovery
time= 2200 ms.
MEG data pre-processing
External noise was removed from MEG data using the signal
space separation method [53], and adjustments in head position
across runs (detected using HPI) were compensated for using
MaxMove software, both implemented in MaxFilter version 2.1
(Elekta Neuromag, Helsinki, Finland). Continuous data were
down-sampled to 200 Hz and low-pass filtered at 40 Hz, before
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conversion to SPM8 format (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).
Eye blinks were detected from the EOG channel (EOG data was
bandpass filtered at 1–15 Hz; local maxima lying more than 3
standard deviations from the mean were considered blinks).
Detected eye blinks were used to generate an average eye blink
timecourse, on which principle components analysis was run to
obtain spatial topographies describing the average eye blink; these
were regressed out of the continuous data (as per [54], without
inclusion of brain source vectors as co-regressors; see http://www.
fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/,lhunt (‘Resources’ tab) for an SPM-based
tutorial). Data were epoched with respect to stimulus onset
(21000 to 2000 ms around stimulus, with 2200 to 0 ms pre-
stimulus baseline), and button press (22000 to 1000 ms around
response, again with 2200 to 0 ms pre-stimulus baseline).
Artifactual epochs and bad channels were detected and rejected
via visual inspection, using FieldTrip visual artifact rejection
routines [55].
MRI processing and forward modelling
All MRI processing and forward modelling was performed
using SPM8. MRI images were segmented and spatially normal-
ized to an MNI template brain in Talairach space; the inverse of
this normalization was used to warp a cortical mesh derived from
the MNI template to each subject’s MRI space [56]. Digitized
scalp locations were registered to head model meshes using an
iterative closest point algorithm, to affine register sensor locations
to model meshes [56]. Forward models were generated based on a
single shell using superposition of basis functions which will
approximately correspond to the plane tangential to the MEG
sensor array [57]. The forward models are implemented in
FieldTrip’s forwinv toolbox [55].
Beamformer source reconstruction
Source reconstruction was carried out using linearly constrained
minimum variance (LCMV) beamforming [58] adapted for use on
Elekta Neuromag data by using variance normalization between
(magnetometer and planar gradiometer) sensor types, and
dimensionality reduction to 64 spatial principal components
[59]. This was used to reconstruct data to a grid across MNI
space, sampled with a grid step of 7 mm. Full details of the
beamforming approach used are given in [5]. The sensor
covariance matrix was estimated separately for stimulus-locked
and response-locked data using data pass band-filtered between 1
and 40 Hz, and 0% regularization.
Whole-brain analysis of left minus right responses
In a preliminary whole-brain analysis, we looked for areas with
greater beta power (13–30 Hz) on trials where the right button was
pressed than on those where the left button was pressed, 500 ms–
1000 ms after the last stimulus was presented (i.e. after option 2
was presented in sequential trials; after both options were
presented in comparison trials). We performed this contrast at
each of the beamformed voxels to produce a whole brain image,
sampling the brain with a 7 mm gridstep. We then performed a
one-sample T-test across subjects to produce the T-statistic images
shown in figure 2A/3A (upsampled to 2 mm isotropic for display
purposes). Inference was performed using a threshold of p,0.05
corrected voxelwise under assumptions of Gaussian Random Field
theory.
We then beamformed data to the peaks from this analysis, and
to a VMPFC peak identified in a previous paper [5], to perform
time-frequency regression in order to test for correlates of value in
these areas.
Time-frequency regression of source-reconstructed data
We used multiple regression to estimate the contribution of the
value of each option and the response made to power in each
frequency band at each timepoint through the decision. In the
sequential trials, at the time of option 1 presentation (figure 2B/E),
we included the value of this option as the regressor (and searched
in contralateral M1 for responses). The full regression model at
each timepoint and frequency band therefore consisted of three
terms – a constant (b0 in regression model below), the effect of the
value of option 1 (b1 below), and a categorical term reflecting
which option was chosen (b2). At the time of option 2 presentation
(figure 2C/F), we included the (action-space) value difference
between contralateral and ipsilateral options (and calculated the
differential response in contralateral minus ipsilateral M1). The
full regression model consisted of four terms – a constant (b0), the
value of contralateral (b1) and ipsilateral (b2) options, and a
categorical term reflecting which option was chosen (b3). The
effect of action value difference was estimated by performing a
contrast of parameter estimates for b1 and b2. In the comparison
trials, we performed the same action-space analysis in M1
(figure 4B); and a goods-space analysis in VMPFC, in which we
included the value difference between chosen and unchosen trials
(figure 6A/B/D/E), separately for harder and nobrainer trials.
Again the full regression model consisted of four terms – a constant
(b0), the value of chosen (b1) and unchosen (b2) options, and a
categorical term reflecting which option was chosen (b3). The
effect of goods-space value difference was estimated by performing
a contrast of parameter estimates for b1 and b2. We also performed
the same analysis for harder sequential trials (figure 6C/F).
Importantly, in all regressions, the inclusion of the final decision
regressor as a covariate allowed us to isolate the variance that
could be explained by value independent of choice. Value
regressors were normalized prior to regression, so they occupied
a similar range of values across subjects.
At each trial, the source-reconstructed data d(ri) was decom-
posed into 40 time-frequency bins linearly spaced between 1 and
40 Hz, by convolving the data with Morlet wavelets (Morlet factor
5) [60]. This yielded, at each trial tr, frequency f, and timepoint t,
an instantaneous estimate of the power at that frequency. Linear
regression was then used to estimate the contribution of the n
explanatory variables (EV) to this estimated power:
d(ri)
tr,f ,t~b0
f ,tzb1
f ,t  EV1trz:::zbnf ,t  EVntrzetr,f ,t
where e is the residual from the regression. The parameter
estimates b1…n, normalized by their variances, were submitted to a
group-level one-sample T-test to test for significant effects of each
explanatory variable.
For statistical inference on the effects of overall value and value
difference on region of interest data, we performed a cluster-based
permutation test at the group level. The logic of this permuation
test is identical to that used in non-parametric statistical inference
of cluster sizes in functional MRI and other MRI based analyses
[61]. We generated 5000 randomly permuted T-statistics for each
timepoint and frequency bin, by randomly sign-flipping the group
design matrix 5000 times. We then thresholded each permuta-
tion’s time-frequency decomposed T-statistic map at a threshold of
T(17).2.0, and measured the maximum size of any cluster passing
this threshold in the map, to build a null distribution of cluster
sizes. We then compared the size of clusters from the true T-
statistic map to those from the null distribution. We report clusters
at a significance level of p,0.05, corrected for multiple compar-
isons across time and frequency.
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Supporting Information
Figure S1 In ‘sequential’ trials, the value of option 1 is encoded
earlier than the value of option 2 in motor cortex beta
desynchronisation, at the time of option 2 presentation. The
regression coefficient of VOpt1 is shown in blue (arbitrary units,
mean +/2 95% confidence intervals across subjects); the effect of
VOpt2 is shown in green.
(EPS)
Figure S2 VMPFC shows no significant value coding in action
space, or coding of action. Layout is equivalent to main figure 5. (A)
Correlates of the value of option 1 at time of option 1 presentation.
Color represents T-statistic. The beta-gamma desychronisation at
approximately 700 ms–1100 ms does not quite survive cluster
correction. (B) Correlates of the action value difference at the time
of option 2 presentation. (C) Contrast of trials on which the chosen
option is contralateral vs. ipsilateral, at the time of option 2
presentation. (D) Timecourse of beta band correlates of value of
contralateral option (blue and choice (red) at time of option 1
presentation. Lines represent mean +/2 95% confidence intervals
across subjects. (E) Timecourse of beta band correlates of action
value difference (blue) and choice (red) at time of option 2
presentation. (F) Correlates of action value difference in compar-
ison trials, timelocked to the response. (G) Contrast of trials on
which chosen option was contralateral vs. ipsilateral in comparison
trials, timelocked to thre response.
(EPS)
Figure S3 pSPL shows no significant value coding in action
space, or coding of action. Layout is equivalent to main figure 5. (A)
Correlates of the value of option 1 at time of option 1 presentation.
Color represents T-statistic. (B) Correlates of the action value
difference at the time of option 2 presentation. (C) Contrast of
trials on which the chosen option is contralateral vs. ipsilateral, at
the time of option 2 presentation. (D) Timecourse of beta band
correlates of value of contralateral option (blue and choice (red) at
time of option 1 presentation. Lines represent mean +/2 95%
confidence intervals across subjects. (E) Timecourse of beta band
correlates of action value difference (blue) and choice (red) at time
of option 2 presentation. (F) Correlates of action value difference
in comparison trials, timelocked to the response. (G) Contrast of
trials on which chosen option was contralateral vs. ipsilateral in
comparison trials, timelocked to the response.
(EPS)
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